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Democracy and Growth Reconsidered:  
Why Economic Performance of New Democracies is not Encouraging   
       Victor Polterovich, Vladimir Popov1  
 
ABSTRACT 
 
There are two innovations as compared to the previous literature on democratization and growth. 
First, not only the level of democracy is taken into account, but also changes in this level in the 
1970s-1990s as measured by the political rights indices of the Freedom House. Second, the 
distinction is made between the rule of law and democracy, the rule of law being defined as the 
ability to ensure order based on legal rules; it is measured by the rule of law, investors’ risk and 
corruption indices. It is found that democratization in countries with strong rule of law (liberal 
democracies) stimulates economic growth, whereas in countries with poor rule of law (illiberal 
democracies) democratization undermines growth. In illiberal democracies institutions are weaker, 
shadow economy is larger and macroeconomic policy is less prudent.  
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DEMOCRACY AND GROWTH RECONSIDERED:  
WHY ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE OF NEW DEMOCRACIES IS NOT ENCOURAGING   
 
Democracy is widely regarded as one of the goals of development and reforms. There are 
disagreements, however, on how important this goal is in relation to the other goals, such as higher 
income and more equitable income distribution, higher life expectancy and educational levels. The 
Rawlsian theory puts a very high, if not an absolute, weight on democratic values: civil liberties, 
including political rights, according to Rawls (1971), “are not subject to political bargaining or to the 
calculus of social interests”. On the other hand, the proponents of Asian values, often tracing the 
origins of their philosophical tradition back to Confucius, argue that the interests of the society as a 
whole are superior to the interests of an individual; hence civil or political rights can in principle be 
sacrificed for the benefit of greater good of the community, such as, for instance, more rapid and 
equitable economic growth. As Amartya Sen puts it, “Lee Kuan Yew, the former prime minister of 
Singapore and a great champion of the idea of “Asian values”, has defended authoritarian 
arrangements on the ground of their alleged effectiveness in promoting economic success” (Sen, 
1997).  
This way or the other, nobody, even the defenders of Asian values, seriously disputes the 
intrinsic values of democracy. The debate is rather about the price of these values, or, to be more 
precise, about the relative weight of democratic values as compared to other developmental goals. 
This value of democratic (political) rights changed dramatically throughout human history and there 
is yet to be a theory to explain the change. This paper focuses instead on a more modest and more 
easily testable issue of the cost of democracy, i.e. on the existence of trade-offs between 
democratization and other developmental goals (growth, equality, life expectancy, education). The 
conventional wisdom today appears to be that these trade-offs do not exist, or that democracy is 
complementary to economic growth and other goals of development. The issue of the price of 
democracy then becomes largely irrelevant because democracy becomes both the end and the mean in 
itself. However, if such trade-offs exist, i.e. if democratization under particular conditions is really 
associated with costs, the issue of the price of democracy becomes tangible and highly important. So, 
are their costs of democracy, does democratization hinders the progress towards other developmental 
goals?  
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Quite a number of scholars recently expressed their disappointment with performance of the 
“third wave” democracies – countries that democratized since 1974 – both in terms of their abilities 
to ensure political and other civil rights and in terms of their economic and social progress. Carothers 
(2002)2 believes that of nearly 100 countries that are considered as recent newcomers to the 
democratic world from authoritarianism, only fewer than 20 (10 countries of Eastern Europe; Brazil, 
Chile, Mexico, Uruguay in Latin America; Taiwan, the Philippines and South Korea in East Asia; 
Ghana in Africa) “are clearly en route to becoming successful well-functioning democracies or at 
least have made some democratic progress and still enjoy a positive dynamics of democratization”.  
Zakharia (1997) looks at the rise of “illiberal democracies” - countries, where competitive 
elections are introduced before the rule of law is established. While European countries in the XIX 
century and East Asian countries recently moved from first establishing the rule of law to gradually 
introducing democratic elections (Hong Kong before and after hand over to China in 1997 is the most 
obvious example of the rule of law without democracy), in Latin America, Africa, and now in many 
former Soviet Union countries democratic political systems were introduced in societies without the 
firm rule of law. Authoritarian regimes (including communist), while gradually building property 
rights and institutions, were filling the vacuum in the rule of law via authoritarian means (lawless 
order). After democratization occurred and illiberal democracies emerged, they found themselves 
deprived of old authoritarian instruments to ensure order, but without the newly developed 
democratic mechanisms (rule of law) needed to guarantee property rights, contracts and order in 
general. 
The hypotheses: democracy and growth  
There is an extensive literature on the interrelationship between economic growth and 
democracy (for a survey see: Przeworski and Limongi, 1993; Afontsev, 1999; Przeworski, Alvarez, 
Cheibub, and Limongi, 2000; UNDP, 2002). Democracy is said to undermine investment (because of 
populist pressure for increased consumption) and to block “good” economic policies and reform 
because the governments in democratic societies are exposed to pressures from particularistic 
interests. Autocratic regimes are believed to be better suited than democratic to oppose pressures for 
the redistribution of income and resources coming from the poor majority of the population (Alesina, 
Rodrik, 1994). It has been also noted that cases of successful simultaneous economic and political 
                                                          
2 See also Diamond (2002) and the subsequent discussion in the Journal of Democracy, Vol. 13, No. 3, July 2002.  
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reforms are relatively rare (Intriligator, 1998) and that introducing voting in post-communist 
countries may be detrimental economically (Cheung, 1998).  
Taiwan, South Korea, Chile before late 1980s, and China until now are usually cited as 
examples of autocracies that were successful in implementing liberalization and reform. But, as Sen 
(1997) points out, “we cannot really take the high economic growth of China or South Korea in Asia 
as "proof positive" that authoritarianism does better in promoting economic growth – any more than 
we can draw the opposite conclusion on the basis of the fact that Botswana, the fastest-growing 
African country (and one of the fastest growing countries in the world), has been a oasis of 
democracy in that unhappy continent”.3  
On the other hand, Olson (1991) argued that autocracies can be predatory, since there is no 
one to control the autocrat. He also believed that the populist problem of democracies can be dealt 
with by introducing constitutions that require supermajorities for certain government actions (2000). 
Sen (1999) argued that comparative studies that are now available suggest that there is no relation 
between economic growth and democracy in either direction and that all major famines occurred 
under authoritarian, not under democratic regimes.4 
A survey of 18 studies (Przeworski and Limongi, 1993) produced mixed results – the only 
pattern that one can discover in these findings is that most studies published after 1987 find a positive 
link between democracy and growth, whereas earlier studies, although not different in samples or 
periods, generally found that authoritarian regimes grew faster. There are conflicting studies of the 
impact of democracy on growth in transition economies – Fidrmuc (2002) reports a moderate 
negative initial and direct effect, which is counterweighted by positive indirect effect 
(democratization facilitates economic liberalization, which in turn is good for growth). On the 
contrary, Popov (2000) find a negative effect of democratization under the poor rule of law on 
                                                          
3 However, whether Botswana should be classified as a democracy, is questioned by researchers (Przeworsky et al., 
2000). The same party was ruling the country since it gained independence in 1966 and we do not know for sure whether 
it would yield power, if faced with a defeat at the polls. Nevertheless the Freedom House gives Botswana very high scores 
when evaluating political rights. 
4 Ellman (2000) challenges this point referring to the lack of famines in the authoritarian USSR after 1947 and to Sudan 
famine that occurred under the democratic regime in 1985-89. A. Sen himself points out to another example – Irish 
famine of the 1840s, but he claims that “the English rule over Ireland at that time was, for all practical purposes, a 
colonial rule” (Sen, 1997).  
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economic performance and do not find any positive effect of liberalization on growth at least in the 
first 10 years of transition.  
Nelson and Singh (1998) use the Gastil’s democracy index to investigate the impact of 
democracy on growth and find a positive correlation. But Gastil’s index includes components that are 
not exactly the measures of democracy, such as the power of the citizenry to exercise the right to own 
property, to make free economic resource-allocation decisions and enjoy the fruits of such decisions 
(Gastil, 1989). The point of this paper is to distinguish between democracy and the rule of law (see 
next section) and to analyze the impact of democracy and democratization per se on economic growth 
under weak and strong rule of law respectively.  
The recent Human Development Report (UNDP, 2002), entitled Deepening democracy in a 
fragmented world, states that “political freedom and participation are part of the human development, 
both as development goals in their own right and as means for advancing human development” 
(p.52). It argues that there is no trade-off between democracy and growth and that democracies in fact 
contribute to stability and equitable economic and social development. Rodrik (1997) does not find 
much of the correlation between democracy and economic growth for 1970-89 after initial income, 
education, and the quality of governmental institutions are controlled for, but provides evidence that 
democracies have more predictable long-run growth rates, produce greater stability in economic 
performance, handle adverse shocks much better than autocracies, and pay higher wages. These 
findings are very much in line with Przeworski et al. (2000): while there is no substantial difference 
in long term growth rates, democracies appear to have smaller variance in the rates of growth than 
autocracies (fewer growth miracle stories, but also fewer spectacular failures), higher share of labor 
in value added and lower share of investment in GDP5.  
However, usually the research on economic consequences of democracy looks at levels of 
democracy rather than at changes in these levels. The data collected by the Freedom House for the 
period since 1972 for over 180 countries make it possible to evaluate the impact of changes in 
democracy, i.e. democratization per se, on economic and social development. It appears that the 
impact is different for developed and developing countries, especially when the strength of the rule of 
law is taken into account: for developing countries with poor rule of law greater democratization in 
1975-99 was associated with lower growth rates (fig. 1,2).  
                                                          
5 One of the most startling findings is about the population dynamics and life expectancy (Przeworski et al., 2000): in 
democracies, controlling for different income, birth rates and death rates are lower and life expectancy is higher.  
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Fig. 1. Change in democracy (political rights) index, points, and GDP per capita 
annual average growth rates in 1975-99, %
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Fig. 2. Ratio of investment climate to increase of democracy index, %, and GDP 
per capita annual average growth rates in 1975-99, %
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More accurate estimates – cross-country regression results – are presented in table 1: average 
growth rates of GDP per capita in 1975-99 are explained by conventional factors (investment, 
population growth, initial level of GDP per capita), democratization and the rule of law indices6.  It 
                                                          
6 Democratization indices are from Freedom House (http://www.freedomhouse.org/ratings/index.htm) – indices of 
political rights, ranging from 1 to 7 for every year (the absolute level shows the degree of authoritarianism, whereas 
change, or democratization shows the increase in democracy). The proxy for the rule of law (civil rights/liberalism) is the 
investment climate index from the International Country Risk Guide (World Bank, 2001). Investors care more about 
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turns out that the level of democracy in 1972-75 had a positive effect on subsequent (1975-99) 
economic growth, but democratization (change in the level of democracy) that occurred in 1975-99 
had a statistically significant negative impact. The ratio of the rule of law indices to democratization 
change is positive and statistically significant, suggesting that democratization under strong rule of 
law may be beneficial, whereas democratization under weak rule of law is detrimental to growth. 
Transition economies that experienced a deep and prolonged transformational recession in the 1990s 
are only partly responsible for the results: the transition dummy variable has a predicted sign, but is 
not very significant and, more importantly, does not undermine the significance of the 
democratization variable.7  
All in all, it appears that the impact of democratization is different for developed and 
developing countries, especially when the strength of the rule of law is taken into account: for 
developing countries with poor rule of law greater democratization in 1975-99 was associated with 
lower growth rates.  Table 2 reports the regression results with the interaction term (rule of 
law*democratization); the third equation is reorganized below, so as to make the threshold level8 of 
the rule of law explicit: 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
guarantees and predictability of property and contract rights than about democratic/political rights, so liberal authoritarian 
regimes like Hong Kong (before and after hand over to China) get very high scores. Another measure is the rule of law 
index  (WDI, 2001; Kaufmann, Daniel, Kraay, Aart, and Zoido-Lobatón Pablo, 1999) that is based on polls of experts and 
surveys of residents (changes from –2.5 to +2.5, the higher, the stronger the rule of law). This latter database contains 
separate indices for the transparency and accountability, political stability, rule of law, control of corruption, government 
effectiveness and quality of regulations.  
 
7 Similar relationship may be observed between life expectancy and democratization. Simple cross-country regressions 
(not reported here, but available from the author) indicate that after controlling for the initial level of life expectancy in 
the early 1970s and for the rule of law index in 2000, both the level of democracy and the change in this level in 1970-
2000, has a negative impact on life expectancy. There is also a strong and robust negative relationship between population 
growth rates and democratization even after accounting for initial level of income, risk and life expectancy; political 
instability, communist past and Islam dummy. Birth rates and population growth rates are considerably higher under 
authoritarian regimes. The latter, however, have a choice of population control policies (like “one child policy” in China); 
in democracies such policies are viewed as an infringement on human (reproductive) rights and are hardly possible.  
8 The idea of the threshold regressions is used extensively in our joint paper “Stages of Development and Economic 
Growth”, where we show that different policies (trade protectionism, accumulation of foreign exchange reserves, increase 
in government spending, liberalization of migration and of capital flows, etc.) are good for economic growth in countries 
with low level of GDP per capita and good quality of institutions, but bad for wealthier countries, especially if their 
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Table 1. Factors explaining the average growth rate of GDP per capita in 1975-99  
– cross country OLS regression results  
Dependent variable Average growth rate of GDP per capita in 1975-99 
Number of observations 85 85 85 85 85 85 
PPP GDP per capita in 1975 -.0005 
*** 
-.0005 
*** 
-.0005 
*** 
-.0005 
*** 
  
2000 investment climate index, 
ICRG 
.11*** .10*** .11*** .11*** .10*** .10*** 
Average investment/GDP ratio 
in 1975-99 
.11*** .12*** .10*** .12*** .11*** .12*** 
Average population growth rate 
in 1975-99 
-.58 
*** 
-.53 
*** 
-.73 
*** 
-.84 
*** 
-.69*** -.83*** 
Level of democracy in 1972-75 
(lower values mean more 
democracy)   
 -.19**     
Increase in democracy index in 
1970-2000 (positive values 
mean democratization) 
  -.20 
*** 
-.18**   
Ratio of the rule of law (ICRG 
inv. Index) to democratization 
in 1975-2000 
    .04** .04** 
Transition economies dummy    -1.03 (Tstat 
=-1.25) 
 -1.29 (Tstat 
=-1.59) 
Constant  -6.81 
*** 
-5.60 
*** 
-5.90 
*** 
-5.60*** -6.38 
*** 
-5.91 
*** 
Adjusted R2 54 56 57 57 56 57 
*, **, *** - Significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
institutions are weak. We try to determine the threshold level of GDP (and other indicators, such as rule of law) in every 
case. The paper is available from the authors.  
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GROWTH= CONST. + CONTR.VAR. + D*(0.18RofL – 0.13), where  
D – democratization (change in democracy index in 1970-2000),  RofL – rule of law index. 
The critical level of the rule of law index is 0.72 (more than in Czech, Jordan, Malta, Uruguay; but 
less than in Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Slovenia, Tunisia): if the index is higher, democratization has 
a positive effect on growth, if it is lower, the impact is negative9. 
The shortcoming of the investors risk and rule of law indices is that they are available only for 
recent years, whereas we are interested in the quality of institutions in the beginning (or at least in the 
middle) of the period of economic growth. The Freedom House computes indices of civil liberties 
available from early 1970s, but they are very correlated with political rights indices (and hence 
measure mostly political/democratic liberties), whereas we are mostly concerned with non-political 
rights (security of life, contracts, property, etc.). POLITY database has the same shortcomings. The 
case in point is Hong Kong, where there was no democracy/political rights neither under the British 
rule, no after the hand over to China in 1997, but where contracts and property rights were and are 
strictly enforced and where there is more rule of law than in most other countries. That is why to 
check the robustness of the results we use corruption perception index (CPI) for 1980-85 – these 
estimates are available from Transparency International for over 50 countries and make a lot of sense 
for our analysis. For instance, they show that in 1980-85 the Soviet corruption was in between 
developed and developing countries, whereas today Russia is at the bottom of the list of developing 
countries. CPI is measured on a 0 to 10 points scale (the higher the index, the lower is corruption, so 
actually it is the index of cleanness, not of corruption). 
 
Table 2. Factors explaining the average growth rate of GDP per capita in 1975-99 
(democratization and the rule of law) – cross country OLS regression results (T-statistics – in 
brackets) 
Dependent variable Average growth rate of GDP per capita in 1975-99 
Number of observations 84 97 84 45 45 
2000 investment climate index, ICRG (ranges 
from 0 to 100%, higher values –better climate) 
0.1*** 
(4.18) 
 0.07*** 
(3.40) 
  
                                                          
9 Other policy variables, such as inflation, import taxes increase in foreign exchange reserves and changes in the size of 
the government were included into the regression to see if the results still hold. They do, these regressions are not reported 
here to save space, but are available from the author. 
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PPP GDP per capita in 1975    -.0008*** 
(-4.99) 
-.0006*** 
(-4.80) 
Log PPP GDP per capita in 1975 -3.27***
(-6.22) 
-2.43***
(-5.37) 
-3.03*** 
(-6.44) 
  
Average investment/GDP ratio in 1975-99, %  0.12*** 
(4.89) 
0.12*** 
(4.44) 
  
Average population growth rate in 1975-99, % -0.45** 
(-2.23) 
-0.33* 
(-1.85) 
-0.45*** 
(-2.51) 
-1.45*** 
(-4.27) 
-1.18*** 
(5.26) 
Increase in democracy index in 1970-2000 
(positive values mean democratization) 
-0.13* 
(-1.65) 
-0.11 
(-1.56) 
-0.13* 
(-1.83) 
-0.49*** 
(-4.12) 
-0.42*** 
(-4.91) 
Interaction term = Rule of law index 
*Democratization in 1975-2000 
0.19*** 
(3.15) 
0.31*** 
(6.85) 
0.18*** 
(3.41) 
  
Interaction term = Corruption perception index 
in 1980-85*Democratization in 1975-2000 
   0.07*** 
(3.84) 
0.05*** 
(3.50) 
Constant  6.52*** 
(3.09) 
7.33*** 
(4.09) 
4.71** 
(2.46) 
7.79*** 
(6.13) 
2.10** 
(1.90) 
Adjusted R2 53 56 63 46 73 
*, **, *** - Significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. Robust estimates for T-statistics and standard errors to 
control for heteroscedasticity.  
 
The results are very much the same. The forth equation in table 2 is: 
 
GROWTH = CONST + CONTR. VAR. + D*(0.0729CORR – 0.485),  
where CORR – is the corruption perception index.   
If corruption index was higher than 6.65 (approximate level of corruption in Chile, Malaysia, 
Spain in the early 1980s), democratization had positive impact on growth. If it was lower, 
democratization had significant negative impact on growth. Adding investment to GDP ratio as one 
of the control variables (equation 5), does not undermine the significance of rule of law and 
democratization variables. The threshold level of the corruption index increases (7.8, the level of 
Japan) and the democratization coefficient is lower, suggesting that the impact of democratization on 
growth is partly, but only partly, occurs through investment.  
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Could the observed negative impact of democratization that occurs under the poor rule of law on 
economic growth and life expectancy be just a coincidence? And if it is not, what is the mechanism of 
such negative influence? We try to test two hypotheses:  
(1) democratization under poor rule of law leads to the decay of state institutional capacity because it 
undermines the effectiveness of the government regulations, including tax regulations (leads to 
the expansion of the shadow economy) and limits the growth of government revenues;  
(2) democratization under poor rule of law makes it difficult to carry out prudent macroeconomic 
policy (low budget deficits and inflation) and export oriented industrial strategy (undervaluation 
of the exchange rate through the accumulation of foreign exchange reserves and high domestic 
energy prices preventing inefficient use of energy) because the state becomes a hostage of 
industrial lobbies and populist groups. 
To reiterate, it is appropriate to distinguish between liberal democracies – strong democratic 
regimes (OECD), liberal and liberalizing autocracies – strong authoritarian regimes (East Asia 
before 1990s, China and Vietnam today) and illiberal democracies – weak democratic regimes (most 
countries in SSA, South Asia, LA). The former two are politically liberal or liberalizing, i. e. protect 
individual rights, including those of property and contracts, and create a framework of law and 
administration, while the latter regimes, though democratic, are politically not so liberal since they 
lack strong institutions and the ability to enforce order (Zakaria, 1997). The most efficient institutions 
are found in countries with the strong rule of law maintained either by democratic (OECD countries 
today) or authoritarian regimes (XIX century Europe, postwar East Asia). The least efficient 
institutions are in illiberal democracies combining poor rule of law with democracy (South Asia, 
Latin America, Sub-Sahara Africa, CIS – Commonwealth of Independent States). Illiberal 
autocracies – less democratic regimes with weak rule of law (Middle East and North Africa – 
MENA) appear to do better than illiberal democracies in maintaining institutional capacity. 
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The process of democratization is associated with little costs and many benefits, if carried out in 
liberal autocracies, i.e. in countries that have already created a system of protection of civil rights 
(except for political rights), or, to put it differently, established mechanisms and traditions for the rule 
of law. But when democratization occurs in illiberal autocracies, i.e. in countries that maintain order, 
but not based on law, the result is the emergence of illiberal democracies, whose record in ensuring 
institutional capacities is the worst, which predictably has a devastating impact on economic growth. 
Table 3 presents a very tentative classification of countries and regions based on these two criteria 
– rule of law (legal protection of civil rights) and the level of democracy (political rights), countries 
in brackets being those with the communist past. The growth rates of GDP per capita in recent four 
decades (1960-2000) amounted to 2.5% in industrialized countries, 4.5% in East Asia, 1.7% in 
MENA, 1.6% in LA, 1.8% in South Asia, 0.3% in SSA. It is noteworthy that among the former 
communist countries with the weak rule of law better economic performance was exhibited by less 
democratic regimes (Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan), whereas poor-
rule-of-law, but more democratic regimes (other CIS countries, Balkan states, Mongolia) generally 
performed less successfully in terms of GDP change (Popov, 2000), and also in terms of life 
expectancy and income inequalities.  
Weak democracies produce weak governments that are prone to the pressure of industrial 
lobbies and populist groups; civil service in weak democracies is being corroded by corruption and 
crony relationships. Their governments cannot ensure high tax compliance and cannot contain the 
expansion of the shadow economy. They cannot collect enough revenues to finance their expenditure 
and have to resort to inflationary financing. They are also unable to ensure accumulation of foreign 
exchange reserves for underpricing the exchange rate to promote export-led growth and they have 
difficulties in appropriating rent from resource industries, so very often resort to price controls for 
fuel and energy. As a result, growth rates in weak democracies are low; increases in life expectancy 
are held back by the collapse of the preventive healthcare, by growing income and social inequalities, 
crime and murder rates10. In the 1990s there were only two regions in the world where life 
                                                          
10 We do not test the impact of democratization on income inequalities and crime rates due to the lack of good quality 
comparable data. The available evidence suggests though that Gini coefficient of income distribution is higher in 
democracies than in autocracies for all GDP per capita groups except for the lowest one (less than $1000). The gap is the 
highest for countries with GDP per capita of $3000 to $5000: 32-35% for dictatorships and 45-47% for democracies 
(Przeworski et al., 2000). 
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expectancy was decreasing – former communist countries of Eastern Europe and former Soviet 
Union, where mortality increased due to stresses of transition, and the southern part of African 
continent, where mortality increased because of the inability of the governments to prevent the spread 
of AIDS. The mechanisms at work in illiberal democracies that undermine growth are shown on a 
tentative scheme below; thick arrows indicate most important links. 
Table 4 presents descriptive statistics for “new democracies” – transition and developing 
countries separately – as compared to all other countries. The unconditional results – uncontrolled for 
other factors, such as the level of development, etc. – are quite similar for new democracies in post-
communist and in developing countries. The growth of GDP per capita in 1975-99 is slower than in 
other countries, the increase in government revenues is less pronounced, the index of government 
effectiveness is lower, the shadow economy is larger. In addition, new democracies seem to run 
higher budget deficits (developing countries), have higher inflation, lower level of foreign exchange 
reserves and slower rates of accumulation of these reserves (developing countries), lower level of 
energy prices (developing countries). Only increases in life expectancy in new democracies in 
developing countries in 1970-2000 are larger (7.6 years) than elsewhere (7.0 years), but in multiple 
regressions (controlling for rule of law and for initial level of life expectancy in early 1970s) both the 
level of democracy and the increase in democratization in the last three decades negatively affect life 
expectancy. The closer scrutiny follows. 
Table 3. Typology of democracies and autocracies (in brackets – former communist countries) 
RULE OF LAW / 
DEMOCRACY 
WEAK RULE OF LAW STRONG RULE OF LAW 
MORE DEMOCRATIC WEAK (ILLIBERAL) 
 DEMOCRACIES: 
Sub-Sahara Africa, South 
Asia, Latin America (most 
CIS, Mongolia, Balkans) 
STRONG (LIBERAL) 
 DEMOCRACIES: 
OECD countries, S. Korea, Taiwan, 
Philippines, Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, 
Uruguay  (Central Europe, Baltics) 
LESS DEMOCRATIC WEAK (ILLIBERAL) 
AUTOCRACIES: 
MENA (Central Asia, 
Azerbaijan, Belarus) 
STRONG (LIBERAL) 
  AUTOCRACIES: 
XIX century Europe, East Asia before 
the 1990s (China, Vietnam) 
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Table 4. Description statistics for new democracies (countries where Freedom House index of 
political right improved by at least 1.5 points from 1972-75 to 1999-2002)   
Countries ALL NEW 
DEMO-
CRACIES  
(62) 
TRANSIT
ION 
COUNTR
IES (20) 
DEVELO-
PING CO-
UNTRIES 
(42) 
ALL 
EXCEPT 
NEW DE-
MOCRAC
IES (148) 
ALL 
COUN
TRIES 
(210) 
Improvement of the index of political 
rights from 1972-75 to 1999-2002 
3,31 3,98 3,00 -0,20 0,98 
ICRG risk rating, 2000 65,104 66,017 64,591 68,918 67,417 
Ratio of investment climate to increase of 
democracy index, % 
9,013 8,279 9,425 20,184 15,786 
PPP GDP per capita in 1999 5510 6900 4885 9588 8059 
Increase in life expectancy from 1970-75 
to 1995-2000 
5,749 1,958 7,550 7,022 6,574 
Annual average growth of GDP per 
capita in 1975-99 
0,818 0,296 0,876 1,410 1,225 
Index of government effectiveness in 
2001  
-0,193 -0,162 -0,210 0,088542 -0,007 
Unofficial economy, 1st estimate 35,1 28,2 40,5 21,8 28,2 
Unofficial economy, 2nd  estimate 33,6 24,8 40,4 23,3 28,3 
Share of central government revenues in 
GDP in  1995-99 as a % of 1971-75 
132 56 136 164,9652 154 
Average annual budget deficit, 1975-99, 
% of GDP 
-4,49 -3,26 -5,01 -3,94308 -4,13 
Average annual inflation, 1975-99, % 30,3 16,6 31,1 13,23991 18,8 
Average FOREX, months of imports, 
1970-99 
3,12 2,62 3,35 3,358422 3,27 
Increase in FOREX, months of imports, 
from 1980 to 1999 
1,53 3,14 0,81 0,446896 0,84 
Ratio of prices of energy to prices of 
clothing in 1993, % (US=107%) 
101,0 48,9 145,1 117,619 110,9 
        
Source: World Bank, 2001; World Development Institute (WDI, 2001); Freedom House; UNDP 
(2002); Friedman, Johnson, Kaufmann, Zoido-Lobaton (1999).  
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SCHEME. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COSTS OF ILLIBERAL DEMOCRACIES 
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DEMOCRACY 
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Demoratization 
          + 
Poor rule of law 
 
 (Poor 
protection of 
civil rights, 
including 
investors’ 
rights, such as 
contract and 
property rights) 
Decline in the effectiveness 
of the government  
Poor tax compliance 
Expansion of the shadow 
economy  
Difficulties in tax collection 
Slow growth of government 
revenues and expenditure 
POOR MACRO & 
INDUSTRIAL POLICY 
Lack of consensus 
Government budget deficit  
Inflation 
Debt accumulation  
Slow FOREX accumulation 
Overvalued exchange rate 
(Dutch disease) 
Price controls for resources 
(low domestic energy prices) 
 
Lower investment 
 
Slower economic growth 
 
 
WEAK INSTITUTIONS 
Government failure to 
provide needed public goods 
(law and order, health care, 
protection of investor’s 
rights, etc.) 
Government failure to 
redistribute openly in favor 
of the poor social groups  
Inability to subsidize 
openly inefficient industries 
and enterprises 
Higher income 
inequalities 
 
Higher crime rates 
 
Lower life expectancy 
High income 
inequalities 
 
Differences in 
efficiency & 
between sectors 
of the economy  
Resource 
abundance 
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   Democracy and institutions 
The importance of institutional factors for economic growth was pointed out more than once 
for various countries and regions. Polterovich (1998) discusses mechanisms for the institutional traps 
that stall growth, while Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi (2002) using instrumental variables for 
institutions and foreign trade conclude that institutions are more important than either openness or 
geography for explaining growth record of particular countries. Rodrik (1996b) found that nearly all 
variations in the rates of growth in labor productivity in Southeast Asian countries in 1960-94 can be 
explained by per capita income in 1960, average length of education and the index of the quality of 
institutions derived from surveys conducted in the 1980s. Similarly, it was found that 70% of the 
variations in investment in 69 countries can be explained by only two factors – GDP per capita and 
institutional capacity index (World Bank, 1997). Stiglitz (1998, 1999) wrote about emerging post-
Washington consensus with the greater emphasis on the role of institutions.  
How to measure the efficiency of state institutions? The collapse of the institutions is often 
observable in the dramatic increase of the share of the shadow economy; in the decline of government 
revenues as a proportion of GDP; in the inability of the state to deliver basic public goods and 
appropriate regulatory framework; in poor enforcement of property rights, bankruptcies, contracts and 
law and order in general (higher crime rates); in macroeconomic instability – high rates of inflation, 
demonetization, "dollarization" and "barterization" of the economy, as measured by high and growing 
money velocity, and in the decline of bank financing as a proportion of GDP; etc. Most of the 
mentioned phenomena may be defined quantitatively with a remarkable result that some authoritarian 
regimes, like South Korea and Taiwan before the 1990s, are closer to “old democracies” (Western 
countries) than to new democracies of the “third wave”. 
 One possible general measure is the trust of businesses and individuals in various institutions. 
In the global survey of firms in 69 countries on the credibility of the state institutions, CIS had the 
lowest credibility, below that of Sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank, 1997, pp. 5, 35). Especially 
striking was the gap between Eastern Europe (EE) and CIS countries: differences in credibility index 
between South and Southeast Asia and EE were less pronounced than differences between Sub-
Sahara Africa and CIS. The government efficiency index (WDI, 2001; Kaufmann, Daniel, Kraay, 
Aart, and Zoido-Lobatón Pablo, 1999) is another measure that are based on polls of experts and 
surveys of residents.  
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Institutions are usually viewed as exogenous – at least in the short and medium term; there are 
not so many studies offering clues to the patterns of the institutional decay. What determines 
institutional capacity of the state, under what particular conditions this capacity 
deteriorates/improves? We look here at the state, rather than non-state, institutions only and define 
the institutional strength as the ability of the government to deliver public goods and to enforce its 
own rules and regulations. Institutional capacity of the state is determined by the efficiency of the 
government (provision of public goods per $1 of government spending) and by the financial strength 
of the government - the share of state revenues/expenditure in GDP.  
The argument is that institutional capacities depend to a large extent on the combination of the 
rule of law and democracy: the data seem to suggest that both – authoritarian and democratic regimes 
with strong rule of law – can deliver efficient institutions, whereas under weak rule of law 
authoritarian regimes do a better job in maintaining efficient institutions (order) than democracies. 
Democratization under the poor tradition of the rule of law leads to the institutional collapse, which 
undermines economic growth. In the absence of rule of law tradition, it is easier to guarantee property 
and contract rights, to enforce state regulations and to maintain order in general with the authoritarian 
rather than with the democratic methods. The immediate results of democratization in the absence of 
the rule of law tradition are greater corruption, poorer enforcement of regulation, higher crime rates.11  
 If the rule of law and democracy indices are included into the basic regression equation, 
explaining output change in transition economies in the 1990s, they have predicted signs (positive 
impact of the rule of law and negative impact of democracy) and are statistically significant (Popov, 
2000). The results are quite impressive: nearly 80% of all variations in output can be explained by 
only three factors – pre-transition distortions, inflation, and rule-of-law-to-democracy index. If 
economic liberalization variable is added, it turns out to be not statistically significant and does not 
improves the goodness of fit. To put it differently, democratization without strong rule of law, 
whether one likes it or not, usually leads to the collapse of output. There is a price to pay for early 
democratization, i.e. introduction of competitive elections under the conditions when major liberal 
rights (personal freedom and safety, property, contracts, fair trial in court, etc.) are not well 
established. 
                                                          
11 Triesman (1999) argues that the current degree of democracy, despite theoretical arguments, has no significant impact 
on the level on corruption; it is only the long exposure to democracy that limits corruption. 
 18
 For all countries there appears to be a robust relationship between different measures of state 
institutional capacity and the ratio of the rule of law to democratization index. Fig. 3 shows such 
relationship for the government effectiveness index (without Lebanon, where democracy index 
deteriorated more than anywhere else and that became an outlier, R2 is 10%), but for other 
institutional capacity measures (transparency and accountability, political stability, control of 
corruption and quality of regulations) the results are very similar.  
 
Fig. 3. Government effectiveness index (WB, 2001)  and the ratio of 
investment climate to democratization in 1975-99
R2 = 0,0373R2 = 0,1063 (w ithout Lebanon)
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 Table 5 summarizes regression results for government effectiveness index. Controlling for 
GDP per capita and the rule of law indices, and even for all other measures of institutional capacity, 
democratization that occurred in 1970-2000 had a clear negative impact on the efficiency of the 
government. The difference between government effectiveness and the rule of law index (measured 
on the same scale) is of particular interest – when this difference is high, government effectiveness is 
based not on the rule of law, but on alternative mechanisms (lawless order). Predictably, such 
difference is negatively correlated with the democratization of the last 3 decades (last three columns 
of table 5). If the corruption perception index is used as a proxy for the rule of law in the beginning of 
the growth period, the forth column in table 5 yields the following equation: 
 
GOVERNMENT EFFECTIVENESS INDEX = CONST. + CONTR.VAR. +D*(0.03*CORR – 0.10),  
where D – democratization in 1970-2000, CORR – corruption perception index in 1980-85.  
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It means that democratization in relatively “clean” countries (with CPI over 3.3 – higher that in 
Colombia, but lower than in India) raises the effectiveness of the government, whereas in corrupt 
countries it undermines the effectiveness of the government.  
 
Table 5. Factors explaining government effectiveness in 2001 – cross-country OLS regression 
results  
Dependent variable Government effectiveness in 2001 Difference between the 
government effectiveness and 
rule of law indices 
Number of observations 155 131 154 45 113 101 87 
PPP GDP per capita in1975      .00003 
*** 
-.00005 
*** 
Log GDP per capita in 1975    .93**
* 
   
1999 GDP per capita  .00001*   -.00002**   
2000 investment climate index, 
ICRG 
    .01**  .007* 
Rule of law index (WDI, 2001) .92*** .83*** .41***     
Transparency and accoun-
tability index (WDI, 2001)  
  .09*     
Political stability index (WDI, 
2001) 
  .11**     
Control of corruption index 
(WDI, 2001)  
  .25***     
Quality of regulations index 
(WDI, 2001) 
  .18***     
Increase in democracy index 
in 1970-2000 (positive values 
mean democratization) 
-.03** -.03* -.06*** 0.10 
** 
-.04** -.04** -.04* 
Interaction term = 
democratization*corruption 
perception index in 1980-85 
   0.03 
*** 
   
Constant  0.13* .04 .28*** 2.78 
*** 
-.63** .14*** -.31 
Adjusted R2 86 87 90 70 7 7 10 
*, **, *** - Significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. Robust estimates for T-statistics and standard errors to 
control for heteroscedasticity.  
.  
 
Institutional decay in weak democracies: government revenues and shadow economy 
 As argued earlier, institutional capacity of the state is determined by the efficiency of the 
government (provision of public goods per $1 of government spending) and by the financial strength 
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of the government – the share of state revenues/expenditure in GDP. It appears that democratization 
in poor-rule-of-law countries not only led to the decline of the efficiency of the delivery of public 
goods and of the enforcement of regulations, but also had an adverse effect on the size of the 
government. Perhaps, nowhere else in the world the process was more pronounced than in transition 
economies in the 1990s. In most of them there occurred a dramatic reduction in the share of 
government spending in GDP and in the efficiency of state institutions.  
 Though much have been said about "big government" and too high taxes in former socialist 
countries, by now it is rather obvious that the downsizing of the government that occurred in many of 
them went too far and adversely affected economic performance. This argument has nothing to do 
with the long-term considerations of the optimal size of the government– it is true that in most post-
communist countries government revenues and expenditure as a share of GDP are still higher than in 
countries with comparable GDP and GDP per capita. But whatever the long term optimal level of 
government spending should be, the drastic reduction of such spending (by 50% and more in real 
terms) could not lead to anything but institutional collapse. Keeping the government big does not 
guarantee favorable dynamics of output, since government spending has to be efficient as well. 
However, the sharp decline in government spending, especially for the “ordinary government”12, is a 
sure recipe for the collapse of institutions. 
When real government expenditure fall by 50% and more - as it happened in most CIS and 
South-East Europe states in the short period of time, just in several years, - there are practically no 
chances to compensate the decrease in the volume of financing by the increased efficiency of 
institutions. As a result, the ability of the state to enforce contracts and property rights, to fight 
criminalization and to ensure order in general falls dramatically. The story of the successes and 
failures of transition is not really the story of fast liberalizers in Central Europe and procrastinators in 
the CIS. The major plot of the post-socialist transformation “novel” is the preservation of strong 
institutions in some countries (very different in other respects – from Central Europe and Estonia to 
China, Uzbekistan and Belarus) and the collapse of these institutions in the other countries. The crux 
of this story is about the government failure (strength of state institutions), not about the market 
failure (liberalization). 
                                                          
12 Expenditure for “ordinary government” – total government outlays, excluding defense, subsidies, investment and debt 
servicing (see Naughton, 1997). 
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Whereas Central European countries and Estonia managed to arrest the fall of tax revenues as 
a proportion of GDP, Russia and most other CIS countries (together with Lithuania, Latvia, and 
several Southeast Europe states) experienced the greatest reduction. Exceptions within CIS prove the 
rule: Belarus, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, i.e. exactly those countries that can be best described as 
illiberal autocracies and that are also believed to have the strongest state institutions among all CIS 
states (the decline in government revenues as a % of GDP in these countries was less pronounced 
than elsewhere in CIS). Ukrainian example, on the other hand, proves that it is not the speed of 
reforms per se that really matters: being a procrastinator, it did nevertheless worse than expected due 
arguably to the poor institutional capabilities (trust in political institutions in Ukraine is markedly 
lower than in Belarus). Belarus, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, commonly perceived as 
procrastinators in terms of economic reforms, nevertheless show better results in terms of the 
dynamics of output than more advanced reformers. At the same time, this is the alternative 
explanation of the Estonian success in economic transformation as compared to most CIS states and 
even to neighboring Baltic states: the usual interpretation that focuses on the progress in liberalization 
may overlook the impact of strong institutions. Not surprisingly, Campos (1999) found evidence that 
government expenditures are positively, not negatively correlated with economic growth in transition 
economies. 
 According to EBRD (1999), the quality of governance in the transition economies, as it is 
evaluated by the companies themselves, is negatively correlated with the state capture index 
(percentage of firms reporting significant impact from sales to private interests of parliamentary votes 
and presidential decrees). The relationship seems to be natural – the less corrupt is the government, 
the better the quality of governance. What is more interesting, both, the quality of governance 
(positively) and the state capture index (negatively) are correlated with the change in share of state 
expenditure in GDP. Countries like Belarus and Uzbekistan fall into the same group with Central 
European countries and Estonia – relatively small reduction of state expenditure as a % of GDP 
during transition, good quality of governance, little bribery, small shadow economy and low state 
capture index (Hellman, Jones, and Kaufmann, 2000). 
 The ratio of the rule of law to democracy index and the decline in government revenues are 
not substitutes, but rather complement each other in explaining the process of the institutional decay. 
These two variables are not correlated and improve the goodness of fit, when included together in the 
same regression, to 88% – better result than in regressions with either one of these variables. The 
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liberalization index, when added to the same equation, only deteriorates the goodness of fit, is not 
statistically significant, and has the “wrong” sign (Popov, 2000). 
The post-communist transition story is by no means unique and has broader implications. As 
table 3 indicates, in illiberal democracies the increase in government revenues is less pronounced, the 
index of government effectiveness is lower, the shadow economy is larger. Table 6 explicitly tells the 
story of the adverse effect of poor-rule-of-law democratization on government revenues and on the 
ability to limit the expansion of shadow economy. Controlling for the initial level of GDP per capita 
and the financial strength of the government in 1970-75, it turns out that the largest amount of 
revenues was collected by (a) countries that were less democratic to begin with – in 1972-75, and (b) 
countries that democratized less than the others in the 1970s – 1990s. On the other hand, the shadow 
economy, controlling for GDP per capita, was larger in countries with poor rule of law and rapid 
democratization. Rapid rise of the unofficial activities in transition economies was only partially 
responsible for this effect.  
 
Table 6. Factors explaining increase in government revenues in 1975-99 and the share of 
shadow economy in GDP in the 1990s – cross country OLS regression results  
Share of the shadow economy in GDP in the 
1990s 
Dependent variable Share of central 
gov. revenues in 
GDP in  1995-
99 as a % of 
1971-75 
1st  estimate 2nd 
estimate 
Number of observations 66 56 47 47 47 33 47 
PPP GDP per capita in 1975      0.002 
** 
 
Log GDP per capita in 1975 .80*** .80*** -37.9 
*** 
-36.8 
*** 
-29.5 
*** 
 -33.5*** 
2000 investment climate index, 
ICRG 
    -.58 
** 
  
Share of central government 
revenues in GDP in 1971-75, % 
-10.80 
*** 
-13.10 
*** 
     
Level of democracy in 1972-75 
(lower values mean more 
democracy)   
67.71 
*** 
73.01 
*** 
     
Increase in democracy index in 
1970-2000 (positive values 
mean democratization) 
-
34.08*
* 
   2.00* 3.74***  
Ratio of the rule of law (ICRG 
inv. index) to democratization 
in 1975-2000 
 7.70** -.77** -.94 
*** 
  -.79** 
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Interaction term = 
democratization*corruption 
perception index in 1980-85 
     -0.86***  
Transition economies dummy    -9.5 
(Tst = 
-1.2) 
-13.3 
(Tst = 
-1.6) 
-22.7*** -14.0* 
Constant  73.0 -218.3 
* 
171.4 
*** 
170.8
*** 
163.3
*** 
37.50 
*** 
159.0*** 
Adjusted R2 64 69 58 59 60 78 58 
*, **, *** - Significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. Robust estimates for T-statistics and standard errors to 
control for heteroscedasticity.  
 
 Using the corruption perception index as a proxy for the rule of law in 1980-85, we get the 
following equation for the unofficial economy (6th column in table 6): 
UNOFFICIAL ECONOMY  = CONST.  + CONTR. VAR. + D*(3.74 – 0.86*CORR), where  
where D – democratization in 1970-2000, CORR – corruption perception index in 1980-85.  
In relatively “clean” countries democratization reduces the share of shadow economy, but in corrupt 
countries democratization leads to the increase of unofficial economy. The threshold level of 
corruption perception index in 1980-85 was 4.3 – in between Portugal and Greece.  
In addition, fig. 4 shows that government effectiveness (subjective indicator of efficiency of 
the state based on surveys) is strongly correlated with the share of shadow economy – the objective 
indicator of the efficiency of state institutions. So illiberal democracies, ceteris paribus, over the last 
three decades had exhibited a poor record in both – efficiency of state institutions and financial 
strength of the government, which predictably translated into the numerous cases of government 
failures, i.e. inadequate provision of public goods leading to slower growth.  
 There should not be any doubt about the impact of the cuts in government spending and lower 
efficiency in enforcement of government regulations, as measured by the increase in the share of 
shadow economy, on growth. This impact is unambiguously negative, as regressions (table 7) 
suggest: controlling for the level of development, investment climate and inflation, investment tend to 
be higher in countries with high and growing level of government revenues. Similarly, controlling for 
the level of development, investment climate and population change, growth rates of GDP per capita 
are lower in countries with smaller governments and larger shadow economy. Even when the control 
variables include the effectiveness of the government, inflation, population growth rates and the size 
of the country (since bigger countries have smaller governments), the impact of the increase in the 
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share of government revenues in GDP is positive and significant, whereas the impact of the level of 
the share of government revenues in GDP is also positive though less statistically significant13.  
 
 
Table 7. Impact on investment and growth of government revenues in 1975-99 and the share of 
shadow economy in GDP in the 1990s – cross country OLS regression results  
Dependent variable Average invest-
ment/GDP ratio in 
1975-99 
Average growth rate of GDP per capita in 
1975-99 
Number of observations 56 51 62 62 47 47 
PPP GDP per capita in 1975 -.001*** -.001*** -.0002* -.0003**   
Log PPP GDP per capita in 
1975 
    -4.97*** -4.99***
2000 investment climate index, 
ICRG 
.32*** .21***   .15*** .16*** 
Average population growth rate 
in 1975-99 
  -.93*** -1.08***   
Share of central gov. rev. in 
GDP in 1971-75, % 
.15** .14*  .05(Tst= 
1.62) 
  
Share of central gov. rev. in 
GDP in  1995-99 as a % of 
1971-75 
.011*** .05** .011* .014*   
Share of the shadow economy 
in GDP in the 1990s, 1st  
estimate 
    -.044***  
Share of the shadow economy 
in GDP in the 1990s, 2nd 
estimate 
     -.044***
Log of annual average inflation 
in 1975-99 
 -1.51**     
Transit. economies dummy    -3.82*   
Constant  -.21 5.62 2.61** 1.88 9.31*** 8.49*** 
Adjusted R2 32 34 12 16 61 59 
*, **, *** - Significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
 
   
                                                          
13These regressions are not reported here to save space, but are available from the author on request. The general idea is 
the same as with the impact of democracy on growth: GROWTH = CONSTANT + CONTR.VAR. + G (a1–a2Y), where G 
– increase in the ratio of government revenues to GDP in 1975-99, Y – PPP GDP per capita in 1975. It turns out that for 
poorer countries the rapid growth of the share of government revenues/expenditure in GDP is good for growth, whereas 
for rich countries the impact is negative.  
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Fig. 4. Index of government effectiveness in 2001 and the share of shadow 
economy in GDP in the 1990s
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Once again, this is not to argue that bigger governments are always better. The point here is 
that in illiberal democracies the ability of the government to provide public services is weak, weaker 
than it should be to maintain reasonable economic growth. The reasons for this weakness are twofold 
– the scarcity of financial resources and the low efficiency of the government apparatus. 
 
Macroeconomic and industrial policies in weak democracies  
The research on Latin American and other countries has proven that the “transitional 
democracies” are less efficient than either authoritarian regimes or well established democratic 
regimes in resisting macroeconomic populism (Kaufman and Stallings, 1991). Macroeconomic 
instability and import substitution industrial policies thus become the inherent features of illiberal 
democracies. Once there is a need, whether mythical or real, to redistribute income in favor of poorest 
social groups and weakest enterprises, coupled with the inability of the governments to raise enough 
taxes for this redistribution activity, the story unfolds pretty much in line with Latin American type 
macroeconomic populism (Dornbush and Edwards, 1989; Sachs, 1989) and leaves a strong sense of 
déjà vu. Constraint by inability to raise tax proceeds and by the simultaneous need to maintain 
redistribution in favor of particular social groups, governments are left basically with only several 
options for indirect financing of transfers and subsidies. Weak governments that cannot redistribute 
income explicitly (direct transfers financed through taxation) have to resort to price controls for 
resource goods, to budget deficits financed via inflation tax or increased domestic and foreign 
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indebtedness, to overvalued exchange rates (leading to excessive consumption financed by running 
down the foreign exchange reserves or foreign borrowings).  
The outlined four mechanisms of non-explicit redistribution are in essence substitutes. The 
more the government redistributes in the form of, say, inflationary financing, the less pressure is there 
to carry out subsidization in the form of energy prices control. Particular governments in particular 
periods may resort to one or several methods14, so it is unreasonable to expect that all illiberal 
democracies will show greater reliance on all these mechanism in a given period of time. 
Nevertheless, we tried to check whether weak governments in 1975-99 have actually relied on 
particular methods of hidden redistribution more than on the others. The results are in tables 8 and 9.  
It is clear from table 4 that new weak democracies – countries where the Freedom House 
index of political rights improved by at least 1.5 point and where the rule of law index was low – had 
higher inflation, lower level and slower accumulation of foreign exchange reserves. The result is also 
visible with a naked eye at fig. 5 and 6 – the higher the ratio of investment climate index (rule of law) 
to democratization progress in the last three decades, the lower is inflation and the higher is the level 
of reserves to import. Table 8 provides estimates of the impact of democratization on macroeconomic 
policies controlling for GDP per capita and investment climate index. The second dependent variable 
in table 8 – policy-induced change in FOREX/GDP ratio – is computed as a difference between the 
actual change in reserves and the change predicted by the regression equation for the “objective” 
reserve level (Polterovich, Popov, 2002), so it is supposed to reflect only changes caused by different 
policies of monetary authorities.  
 
 
 
                                                          
1414 Different countries in different periods resorted to one or more of the described above mechanisms of implicit 
redistribution. In Russia, for instance, the government was initially (1992-94) relying on controlling resource prices and 
inflationary financing. Since 1995, when exchange rate based stabilization was carried out and the ruble reached 70% of 
its purchasing power parity value (i.e. Russian prices, including resource prices approached 70% of the US prices, which 
was the apparent overvaluation of the ruble), the government relied mostly on debt (domestic and foreign) financing and 
redistribution via overvalued exchange rate. Since 1998 financial crisis, however, leading to the collapse of the 
overvalued rate and to the cessation of international and domestic debt financing, the government has to rely once again 
largely on price control (via export taxes and export restrictions) on major resource exports (oil, gas, metals). 
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Table 8. Factors explaining inflation, budget deficit and accumulation of foreign exchange 
reserves (FOREX) in 1975-99 – cross country OLS regression results  
Dependent variable Logarithm of 
average annual 
inflation in 1975-
99, % (GDP 
deflator) 
Average 
annual 
budget 
surplus as a 
% of GDP 
in 1975-99 
Policy-induced 
change in 
FOREX/GDP 
ratio in 1970-
99, p.p. 
Average 
ratio of 
FOREX to 
import in 
1970-99, 
months  
Number of observations 87 83 115 122 122 123 
Log PPP GDP per capita in 1975  .66**     
2000 investment climate index, 
ICRG 
-.05*** -.07*** .25*** .23***   
Share of central government 
revenues in GDP in 1971-75, % 
      
Level of democracy in 1972-75 
(lower values mean more 
democracy)   
-.15** -.11 
(Tst = 
1.59) 
.55**    
Increase in democracy index in 
1970-2000 (positive values 
mean democratization) 
.19*** .19***  -.92**   
Ratio of the rule of law (ICRG 
inv. Index) to democratization 
in 1975-2000 
    .51*** .08*** 
Constant  6.5*** 5.1*** -23.6*** 10.0 7.3*** 2.1*** 
Adjusted R2 30 32 16 8 35 17 
*, **, *** - Significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
 
Fig. 5. Inflation and the ratio of investment climate to increase in democracy 
index in 1975-99
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Fig. 6. Average ratio of foreign exchange reserves to imprort (months) and the 
ratio of investment climate to democratization in 1975-99
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Table 9. Factors explaining ratio of domestic to international prices – cross country OLS 
regression results  
Dependent variable Average ratio of domestic to the 
US prices in 1975-99, % 
Ratio of relative (as a % of the 
US) domestic energy prices to 
relative clothing prices 
Number of observations 149 102 105 68 68 
PPP GDP per capita in 1975  .004*** .003***   
Log PPP GDP per capita in 1999    -13.2*** -11.9*** 
2000 investment climate index, 
ICRG 
     
Average ratio of trade to PPP 
GDP in 1980-99 
.37*** .34*** .31***   
Net fuel imports as a % of total 
import, average 1960-99  
-.46***  -.40*** .73* .87** 
Interaction term = (change in 
democracy index)*(ratio of 
fuel exports to fuel imports) 
 .07**    
Level of democracy in 1972-75 
(lower values mean more 
democracy)   
-7.28***  -4.18*** 9.54* 15.4*** 
Increase in democracy index in 
1970-2000 (positive values 
mean democratization) 
2.43**  1.45 
(Tst= 
1.0) 
-11.9** -3.94 (Tst=-
0.74) 
Transition economies dummy     -109*** 
Constant  62.5*** 36.1*** 51.6*** 194*** 144*** 
Adjusted R2 52 48 55 18 35 
*, **, *** - Significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
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It turns out that democratization under the weak rule of law implies generally (controlling for 
GDP per capita, fuel imports and trade/GDP ratios) an overvalued exchange rate, i.e. higher ratio of 
domestic to US prices (probably due to less intensive reserve accumulation), except for domestic 
energy prices that are lower (automatic redistribution in favor of energy users). The overvaluation of 
the exchange rate was especially pronounced for fuel rich illiberal democracies (Dutch disease) – see 
the interaction term in table 9.   
At the same time, there was no evidence of higher government debt in illiberal democracies; 
budget deficits were higher in poor-rule-of-law-high-level-of-democracy countries, but there was no 
evidence that an increase in democracy contributed to the deficit. Lower energy prices in illiberal 
democracies are mostly due to the impact of transition economies – once the transition dummy is 
introduced into the equation the effect becomes statistically insignificant. 
 
Conclusions 
1. There may be at least two reasons why extensive research on the link between democracy 
and growth produces conflicting results. First, previous papers looked mostly at the level of 
democracy, but not at changes in this level. Second, and most important, very often the distinction 
between the rule of law (liberalism or civil rights) and democracy (political rights) was not rigorous. 
This paper controls for the rule of law, which is defined as the ability of the state to enforce rules and 
regulations (and measured by the rule of law and investors’ risk indices), and examines the impact of 
democratization on economic growth. It is found that democratization in countries with strong rule of 
law (liberal democracies) stimulates economic growth, whereas in countries with poor rule of law 
(illiberal democracies) democratization undermines growth. Thus, a certain threshold level of the rule 
of law is required to reap the benefits of democratization.  
2. In illiberal democracies - countries with poor tradition of the rule of law undergoing rapid 
democratization – the weakening of the state institutional capacities occurred due to slower than 
elsewhere growth of government revenues and expenditure, as well as due to poor enforcement of 
government regulations (larger shadow economy). The deterioration of institutions had an adverse 
effect on economic growth. 
3. To add insult to injury, illiberal democracies were not able to carry out reasonable 
macroeconomic and industrial policies. The weak state was unable either to eliminate redistribution 
in favor of inefficient enterprises and sectors of the economy, or to carry out this redistribution 
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openly, and thus had to resort to hidden redistribution (price controls to cope with resource rent, 
inflation tax, debt financing, overvalued exchange rate, accumulation of non-payments by non-
competitive industries). Such redistribution resulted in import-substitution policy and macroeconomic 
instability (budget deficits and debts, inflation, currency crises), which undermined growth potential. 
4. It should be recognized that there is a trade-off between democratization in poor-rule-of-
law countries and other developmental goals. Early transition to electoral democracies in countries 
with weak rule of law is detrimental to growth and inflicts high economic and social costs, because it 
undermines institutional capacity of the state and it’s ability to carry out responsible economic 
policies. The practical implication of this analysis is that authoritarian regimes that still remain in the 
world (the largest would be China) should not rush to democracy overnight. Democracy building, like 
market type reforms, should be gradual, rather than shock therapy type, and should go hand in hand 
with the strengthening of the rule of law, so as not to undermine the potential of the government to 
maintain order. Democracy, participation in decision making and civil society are precious 
developmental goals by themselves and they should not be compromised by bad implementation.  
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